

PHILOSOPHY,
RELIGION AND
EDUCATION

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion

Four Wrongs and the Future

The first wrong was the organized extermination of the Jews by the Nazis. This belonged to a different dimension of evil than the others. A combination of wicked cruelty and scientific planning produced a series of monstrous deeds against this people which we cannot begin to comprehend. These deeds were not done by the Arabs, a fact that it is important to remember.

The second wrong accompanied an attempt to aid the survivors of the first. This attempt was also the result of the interpretation of Judaism which emphasized the need of a homeland in the Holy Land. It was the work of idealists who sought to build a community that would embody some fulfillments of ancient Jewish aspirations. It was made possible by a confused situation growing out of the breakup of the Turkish empire and of the claims and counterclaims to rightful sovereignty over the narrow strip called Palestine. Arguments about these claims and counterclaims move on different levels and the minds even of honest and just men who disagree never meet on this question. But whatever may have been right in the establishment of the state of Israel, there was a wrong done to Arabs who called Palestine their home and to the feelings of the whole Arab world. The Arab refugees may now be in part victims of Arab callousness and pawns of Arab politics, but they are also witnesses to and symbols of the wrong which accompanied the establishment of Israel on Arab soil.

But Israel was established under the sanction of the United Nations, with the encouragement of the United States. The Jews were encouraged

by most of the nations to make this part of Palestine their homeland and a million-and-a-half Jews have put their lives into it. Israel as a human fact has been given a right to exist by the nations even though the Arabs and their defenders say that the nations gave what they had no right to give. The human fact of Israel is there and to allow it to be destroyed would be a wrong resembling the first in horror.

The third and fourth wrongs cannot be mentioned in order of their occurrence for they have been a series of actions and reactions—the expansionism of Israel and the provocations of the Arabs, or the provocations of the Arabs and the expansionism of Israel. If one starts by assuming that Israel has no right to exist, one will see chiefly self-defense on the Arab side. If one starts by assuming that Israel does have a right to exist, one will see chiefly self-defense on the side of Israel.

This is an issue on which men who agree on most other issues are in complete deadlock. The territory involved is small but this is no marginal issue, for out of it come most dangerous conflicts for the control of the Middle East. Out of it comes the fanatical Arab nationalism that is willing to risk Russian intervention to gain strength against Israel. And out of it comes blindness to the valid claims in this Arab nationalism on the part of liberals in the West who usually recognize such claims where nations are moved by the impulse to overcome the remnants of colonial domination.

The first wrong cannot be undone. The second

Vol. XVI, No. 22 December 24, 1956 \$3.00 per year; 15 cents per copy

wrong cannot be reversed without doing new injustice. The third and the fourth wrongs are still being enacted. There can be no peace in the Middle East until Israel admits that the Arabs have a real case and until the Arab nations accept the fact that Israel has been given a right to exist and has lived by that right long enough to have a real case. The United Nations and the United States have responsibilities on both sides. Concessions will have to be made by both sides and costly guarantees will have to be given to both sides by the major powers, especially by the United States, through the United Nations.

If nations as such have difficulty in admitting their part in this series of wrongs, there must at least be awareness of them among both leaders and people if there is to be a settlement. There must also be a recognition that the settlement itself will not be fully just in relation to past wrongs and that at best it may provide a basis for a better future for both sides and for the world which is torn by their conflict.

J.C.B.

THE STRUGGLE IN HUNGARY

THE CONFLICT in Hungary between brave patriots and Russian power will surely be recorded in history as one of the epics of human heroism. The Hungarian rebels are still holding out after weeks of the most cruel efforts to suppress their rebellion by the sheer force of military might. One may speculate about the ingredients of such a stubborn heroism. Probably, as one Hungarian student has observed, desperation is a chief motivating power, for many of the young men gladly chose death rather than deportation to Siberia. All of the pent-up hatred of the foreign oppressor came to a climax when Russian guns killed hundreds and even thousands of unarmed demonstrators. The whole nation has been absolutely united in its resistance, and that is perhaps the chief reason for the success of its struggle against a ruthless and powerful foe. But the hatred and the sense of outrage would have been unavailing if the qualities of courage, which persuade men that man's integrity is dearer than life itself, had been lacking. One can learn more from such epics than from many tomes on the nature of sacrifice and martyrdom.

On the political level the heroic struggle has stripped Soviet power of all the garments of respectability which it has so assiduously striven for

since Geneva. It has decimated the ranks of western European Communist parties and has even persuaded a reluctant Nehru to condemn the Russian savagery. It may also have prompted many American idealists to give up illusions about Russia, nurtured since Geneva.

As far as our policy is concerned, one must both welcome the tremendous enlargement of our original relief plans, so that 21,500 rather than 5,000 refugees are now to be admitted to the country, and express amazement that neither the United States nor the United Nations has been more effective in resisting Russian tyranny.

We must express amazement at the powerlessness of the whole world to counter this expression of the cruelties of despotism. We have not insisted on sending United Nations observers to Hungary, or rather we have weakly accepted the Hungarian government's objection to their being sent. We have not challenged the credentials of the representative of the puppet government in the United Nations; and we have not insisted that Miss Kethly, the representative of the Nagy government who visited New York, be heard. Charity is good; but it is not a substitute for prudent political action.

Perhaps the impotence is due to the shattering of the Western alliance, which has allowed the Asian-Arab-Russian bloc to lame the actions of the Assembly. We speak bravely of strengthening the United Nations and of acting through the United Nations. But without a united Western leadership the United Nations is threatened with the fate of the old League of Nations. This is one of the many sad aspects of the destruction of the Western alliance, consequent upon our original heedlessness and the resulting desperation of our democratic allies.

Perhaps this impotence is due to the American doctrine that force is ruled out in any and all circumstances. This allows the Communists to have their way merely by threatening force.

R.N.

THE LONG ROAD TO DESEGREGATION

LITTLE BY LITTLE the real significance of the now famous Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation in the public schools is becoming clear. Likewise, it is becoming apparent that this momentous decision did not, and could not, mark the end of an evil institution, but rather the beginning of a long process of bringing custom into line with the evolution of basic law.

What is going on in the nine-state southern area where White Citizens Councils have become powerful social forces is not surprising. Vast progress has already been made in the direction of public acceptance of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution though, to be sure, defiance and outbreaks of violence are what make headlines. Yet in many communities and in extensive geographic areas the going will be rough for a good while.

The notion that such a decision has a self-enforcing quality is quite erroneous—as was the widespread assumption that when the Supreme Court upheld the Volstead Act national prohibition had somehow been firmly established. This is not due merely to provocative activities on the part of habitually perverse elements in the population. There are many high-minded persons in the South whose souls are troubled by the ethical implications of this struggle who nevertheless can see no way of quickly righting an ancient wrong. Resistance to law is often a response to social pressures which, however valid and salutary in themselves, put an insupportable burden upon people whose lives have been conditioned by an inherited way of life. With all such, appeals to uphold the Constitution, to honor the courts, to be loyal to democracy are ineffectual because they represent an oversimplification of the problem. Evils that have a tragic character are not expunged by recourse to law.

Indeed, one may question the use of the word "enforcement" with reference to any statute or legal principle that applies to entrenched custom and deep-seated attitudes. It was the glory of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in the school segregation case that it embodied a great moral judgment: that forcing human beings to keep apart from their fellows because they bear a mark of social inferiority does violence to the Constitution of this nation. The significance of that great pronouncement is that it expresses a moral consensus which our faith in democracy affirms to be the most powerful directive, *in the long run*. But to compel the population of a state or a region to accept the Court's ruling is impossible, just as it has been impossible to compel compliance with some other provisions of the Constitution.

The problem before us is one of achieving popular acceptance of a principle, rather than of enforcing a decree. Government—federal or state—can prohibit and punish acts that obstruct the implementation of the law, and this is of the utmost importance in the present situation. But no power, political or military, can force a moral reformation

upon a community. Therein, as Shakespeare says, "the patient must minister to himself."

E. F. J.

NEHRU'S CONTRIBUTION

THE RELATIONSHIP between Prime Minister Nehru and the American people has its ups and downs but it is one thing about which Americans should think clearly and fairly. It is very easy to be greatly irritated by Nehru. He is a sage, touched by martyrdom because of his many years in British prisons, who now has power. Readers of his autobiography, *Toward Freedom*, often regard him as one of the greatest and most attractive figures of our time. But when the sage himself becomes involved in all of the exigencies of politics while he continues to give moral lectures to the world, the contrast between his pretensions and his own unrecognized compromises creates a problem even for his admirers. The difficulty is the greater when the sage has various deep though quite understandable prejudices, in this case a prejudice that identifies imperialism only with what white nations do to colored nations.

While these irritations are natural, they should not be allowed to obscure the most important fact about Nehru, the fact that he is the embodiment of India's hope for a better future. He is the chief obstacle both to communism and to a reactionary political Hinduism in India. He is deeply and sincerely a democrat and he hates totalitarianism as a possible choice for India. His neutral position in international affairs has created much confusion, but he is right in thinking that it is better for India to avoid military alliances, and in thinking that it is better for the world if it is not divided into two solid blocks with no one who can mediate between them. Perhaps he has been sufficiently shocked by the events in Hungary so that he will be more realistic than he has been about Communist imperialism.

In any case, if he succeeds in preserving the freedom of India, Nehru will be making as great a contribution as any one man can make to the world's freedom. While he is our visitor we should emphasize this contribution and we should understand some of the historical reasons for his lack of realism about the Communist world. Our feelings and our policy should be directed to the strengthening of our cooperation with India for the sake of her freedom, and for the sake of the importance of a free India for the freedom of the world.

J. C. B.

Centennial Thoughts About Wilsonian Diplomacy

Harold P. Ford

WE CAN do Woodrow Wilson more honor in his Centennial not by fashioning a mystical greatness about him but by acknowledging his human greatness and frailty, tempering our criticisms with the realization that we enjoy the luxury of the past perfect, whereas he, as President, knew only the present imperative and the future conditional. It is in this spirit that several aspects of his legacy of diplomatic method seem open to question. Such judgment should seek to avoid any tendency to overstate the case against his "idealist" diplomacy, or not to be appreciative of the ever-changing context of problems and attitudes within which he had to change the America of 1914 as best he could into a new America of 1917-1920. Bearing these cautions in mind, and acknowledging the deservedly high place Woodrow Wilson holds in history, we may nevertheless criticize his diplomacy in that it was, to perhaps too great a degree, simple in its conception, symbolic in its presentation, ideological in its tactics, and pretentious in its moral claim.

Simple Conception

Wilson, having had practically no interest in or appreciation of world politics prior to becoming President, retained throughout his career a tendency to see foreign policy alternatives in simple terms of black-and-white. Though he gained a somewhat greater appreciation after 1914 of the intricacies of world affairs, his following statement of 1914 nevertheless remained somewhat typical:

And therefore I am glad that there are some simple things in the world. One of the simple things is principle. Honesty is a perfectly simple thing. It is hard for me to believe that in most circumstances when a man has a choice of ways he does not know which is the right way and which is the wrong way . . . And so I say that it is patriotic sometimes to prefer the honor of the country to its material interests.

Closely akin was a somewhat disdainful attitude on Wilson's part with respect to professional diplomats and diplomatic procedures. He tended to prefer his own acumen or that of other trusted amateurs, believing that right attitudes and correct principles and fresh, unencumbered minds would better carry the day, somewhat as follows:

Now when it comes to doing new things and doing them well, I will back the amateur

against the professional any time, because the professional does it out of the book, and the amateur does it with his eyes open upon a new world and with a new set of circumstances. He knows so little about it that he is fool enough to try the right thing.

These simple attitudes may have been well intentioned, but they led Wilson to imprecision, shaky improvisation, unfounded expectations and, somewhat like his Assistant Secretary of the Navy a generation later, too-great confidence in his own personal powers of analysis and persuasion. Moreover, Wilson did not seem to appreciate, to the degree that later American diplomatists have had to, that decision-making is not a simple matter of fresh minds, or of lofty intentions, or of right and wrong, or of principle versus expediency; but is instead more often a necessary, professional, agonizing choice between two or more principles, each of which may seem to command the same degree of morality and honor.

Symbolic Presentation

A second area where Wilson may be questioned was that of his tendency to go too far in reducing world problems to symbols, in an effort to make these vast problems distinct in the conceptual lenses of the public at large. To make diplomatic problems comprehensible and to elicit wide spread support of needed war measures, the Wilson administration as we know resorted to wide use of myth-making, ranging from the clear heights of "war to end wars" to the questionable heights of the "Hun-hating" efforts of the Committee of Public Information (the Creel Committee). Symbols, slogans, and catch-words succeeded in that they caught the desired imaginations of countless millions the world over, filling them with a sense of identification, participation, and purpose in the conduct of a war effort which Wilson termed "a peoples' war, not a statesmen's." Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

Wilson, however, created a number of difficulties for himself and for posterity by so stimulating "peoples" or "housetop" diplomacy. In so doing, he helped to spark mass emotions which in time broke him and his desired peace as the post-war "clarified common thought" ceased to see in him the incarnation of human hope and turned to new symbols such as "normalcy." Wilson had believed that once the desired attitudes and policies had

Mr. Ford is associate professor of political science at Davidson College in North Carolina.

been sold to the people through the use of symbols, an enlightened public opinion would then support the rational efforts of the world's statesmen to create a lasting peace. Yet the very emotional appeal of these symbols he had created contributed to clamorous and divided opinions once the war was over, and did little to make reason a motive force superior to fears and to regard for material advantage. Moreover, since the wide appeal of his idealistic symbols had been based on the fact that they meant all things to all people, this fragile basis shattered in the face of the vastly differing interests emergent in the cold reality of Versailles and post-war Washington. Wilson was justifiably aware of the pitfalls of secret diplomacy, yet it may be questioned whether his particular answer to the dilemma of secret versus open diplomacy did not create as many problems as it solved. True, he did raise the world's vision beyond national sovereignties, yet subsequent world stability has also had to contend with certain other tendencies present in the legacy of his diplomatic method: the invocation of patriotic piety, the continuing proclivity of many peoples to think only in symbolic patterns, the lazy placing of faith in institutions *themselves* (as the UN) rather than in the dynamics of wise and patient and quiet politics within those institutions, and the personalization of diplomacy into scapegoats who "lose" countries and heroes, who slay dragons before conference microphones and Klieg lights.

Ideological Tactics

The third area of question proceeds largely from Wilson's personality and character: namely, a tendency to employ inflexible ideals as a tactical weapon against opponents. Present throughout his career, this quality of his make-up had revealed itself sharply during his long and bitter personal struggles at Princeton, where, according to Arthur Link:

He revealed a disturbing inclination to throw every dispute, no matter how trivial the issues involved, upon the high plane of universal morality, and he appealed to universal principles to support his cause. He also developed a practice of making every controversy personal and identifying the men who opposed his proposals as personal enemies.

At Princeton and thereafter, Wilson had difficulty conceding that someone with an opposite view could be as honest and well-intentioned as himself. As revealed by the severity of many of his polemics, whoever was against him was somehow of lesser

moral stature, whether that opponent happened to be Princeton's Dean West in 1907, the Germans in 1917, the Allied statesmen in 1919, or the Republican Party in 1918 and 1920.

Although there were certain basic ideals and interests for Wilson, as there are for us, not susceptible of negotiation or compromise, the proclivity of his "open diplomacy" to transform almost *every* issue into immutable moral principle led him to two-fold grief: by heightening irrational thought it hamstrung legitimate and needed diplomatic processes; and, as a result, forced Wilson himself to violate his first precept, that of open diplomacy, by retiring behind locked doors with Clemenceau and Lloyd George to decide in secret virtually the fate of the world. Insofar as we have inherited the legacy of Wilson's "public diplomacy," we may legitimately ask how its moral righteousness on almost every tactical issue makes us morally superior to Communist variations on the same theme.

Pretentious Moral Claims

Lastly, Wilson's moral certainty that America had a unique "mission" in the world may itself be seriously questioned on moral grounds. Americans, Wilson felt, were "custodians of righteousness." American democracy was a model for the world. Peace could not be assured until democracy was safely established everywhere in the world. From such premises Wilson came to identify America's interests with the interests of men everywhere, America's will with that of humanity:

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community.

He thereupon compounded this claim by concluding: "They are the principles of mankind and *must prevail*" (my italics). Wilson had no guarantee, even though a Presbyterian, that he was not confusing America's voice with that of God. Nor had he any absolute charter directing that American principles *must prevail* over those of the Germans, or the British, or the Russians, or anyone else. His claims constituted moral pretension, and as such seem the most vulnerable facet of his diplomacy.

Hazards in the Wilsonian Legacy

Wilson's legacy of such moral certitude contains a number of hazards for our generation. In the first place, it continues to feed our self-righteousness but not our wisdom as to how to proceed. Secondly, it

proclaims the absolute nature of moral principles in a world where even such principles change and are therefore relative: witness unrestricted submarine warfare being a *casus belli* in 1917, yet a chief instrument of our victory in World War II; or, our horror at the leveling of Rotterdam in 1940, yet our relatively clear conscience in the face of our own incineration of Hiroshima not too long thereafter. Moral pretension thus justifies even the use, as Wilson said, of "Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit." Lastly, moral pretension may lead a nation to such corporate imagery as the "fantasy of omnipotence," the psychological expectations of which are almost certain to breed frustration and despair as they encounter the competing power and moral pretension of other nation-states.

It has been the thesis of this article that certain aspects of Wilsonian diplomacy may be questioned inasmuch as they have heightened the degree to which subsequent American diplomacy has been marked by unfounded expectations, blurred images of reality, needless inflexibility, and pretentious moral claim. The basic assumption back of these judgments is that Wilson was a great man, but a man some of whose good intentions went astray or were themselves victims of his own frailties. Yet, cognizant of certain hazards in the Wilsonian legacy, we should seek to avoid as well the nearsightedness and power worship that have been present in some of our foreign policies in recent years. The sober judgments of realism must modify the excesses of Wilsonianism, but they must also partake of the Wilsonian vision of a future concert of power. The urgencies of our age demand that these elements be combined to give us a reasoned foresight such as that wished for by Thomas Hobbes, no Wilsonian, in his *Leviathan*:

For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions and self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.

For unless we can develop such foresight, war such as Wilson knew may some day be repeated on an incalculably greater and more terrifying scale.

Christmas Greetings to Our Friends and Readers!

We thank you for your consistently generous support of our journal and wish you all a joyful Christmas! . . . We also renew our invitation to become Associates of Christianity and Crisis. Contributions for Associates run from \$10.00 to \$100.00 including a subscription to the journal, and can be deducted (except for subscription price) for tax purposes.

THE EDITORS

WORLD CHURCH: NEWS AND NOTES

Gollwitzer on Hungary

GERMANY (EPS) "During these last weeks our hands have been tied as, with burning hearts, we watched Hungary's struggle for freedom."

Helmut Gollwitzer, Professor of Theology at Bonn, and author of a well-known book on communism, *Unwilling Journey*, said this in addressing the official Hessian celebration of Remembrance Day 1956.

"This is not the moment to propound political doctrines," Dr. Gollwitzer declared, "but in our thoughts on Remembrance Day our first concern must be for the people of Hungary. We bow our heads in recognition of their heroic struggle and their immeasurable sacrifice. They are fighting for our cause, for human freedom in face of tyranny; that is why I hope our minds are tortured by the problem of how to help them, without setting the whole world ablaze.

"The movement in Hungary and Poland teaches us to set a higher estimate on the political importance of the spirit of a people than we have often done in the past. We have allowed ourselves to be too much impressed by the enormous material power at the disposal of a 20th-century state, and have often been defeatist in our attitude to the power of the spirit. Now it has been proved that people cannot be permanently degraded into mere raw material for their rulers to mould just as they wish. They have given fresh significance to the words 'justice,' 'freedom' and 'democracy' which we so often misuse. The spirit of the people has exercised such pressure, in face of the armoured divisions and the secret police, that changes took place which we would never have believed possible, and of which we still cannot foresee the repercussions. Even the Soviets cannot prevent these repercussions.

"During these days," continued the German theologian, "we have seen that even Communists can change and that communism therefore does not always remain the same. We should not build illusory hopes on that fact, but these experiences should give us far more confidence in the power of the spirit.

"Although spiritual power alone is not sufficient to avert the menace of tyranny, nevertheless it is the decisive factor. If we recognize the significance of the moral forces which have been at work during the last few weeks, we must give up playing nervously with the idea of using the atom-bomb, to which many people in the West still cling."

TELEVISION

THE ROMANCE OF THE DOER

In "Gunsmoke," the cowboy suffers a demotion from the heroic to the human. The cowtown marshal no longer symbolizes the power of Good, with whom the forces of Evil join in dubious battle on the plains of Kansas, but becomes a cop who knows his job.* The protagonist, Matt Dillon, is not inspired by the hatred of evil, but appointed by the territorial government to keep order in a town. This does not mean that he is defender of the hardworking pioneer, the church and the schoolteacher from the East. He protects a little town from strangers and killers who are liable to make it hard for a man to get a drink in peace. Obviously such an order has no ultimate value; it is simply to be preferred by sensible men to anarchy. If a man doesn't like it that way, then he'd better stay out of Dodge City.

In the traditional Western, not only is there an absolute cleavage between good and evil men, but the techniques appended to the Good are radiant with the power of goodness. The hero's bullets shoot straighter than the villain's and his sidekick may be counted on to come through with a miraculous reading of hoofprints. (American moral theology might be read as a protest against these two conventions of the Western: first, that good and evil are unmixed; and second, that there is no gap between goodness and the problems of technique and power.) Dillon, however, has no whitewashed horse and his six-gun holds only six bullets. As in the case of the modern police officer his skills are those of the professional.

The traditional Western is a type of romantic ritual. Absolute good confronts and confounds evil in a splendid procession of stagecoaches, hoofbeats, bootscuffling and bullets: a prairie version of Sir Walter Scott. "Gunsmoke" would appear by contrast to be realistic. There is an interest in professional techniques and judgment rather than in the heroic imposition of will. Matt Dillon is permitted personal limitations, and the plot requires his realistic appraisal of himself and others. All these qualities would seem to identify the TV show with realistic drama rather than celebrational horse opera.

And yet, the romantic element in "Gunsmoke" is present, for "Gunsmoke" conforms to the roman-

ticism of Rudyard Kipling rather than Sir Walter Scott. Kipling didn't justify the British Empire morally, as much as delight in the way it works. Private Mulvaney and Kipling's other heroes are professionals, men who, with equally good judgment, know how to take a man or a gun apart. Similarly, Matt Dillon is devoted, not to the Good, but to doing a good job. This isn't realism at all, but rather, a romance about "doing." This is romance after the manner of the British documentary of the conquest of Mt. Everest, where the camera focusses on trained men and equipment, rather than romance in the manner of *Annaphurna*, where the writer focusses on the illimitable heights of the human spirit.

There are two other attempts at a romance about "doing" in TV drama, both of which are in significant contrast with "Gunsmoke": the romances of the police station and of the executive suite.

"Gunsmoke" is interested in the isolated professional and his craft, not in technique which has become a whole system. Herein it differs from the modern police story after the model of "Dragnet." The real hero of the police story (with the exception of those centered in the heroic district attorney or the newspaper editor, which are gracelessly transposed Westerns) is the System. The hero is a network of files and lab experts, tipsters and telephone calls: a transcontinental, nerved-up and romanticized system. Dillon, however, has a lonely responsibility, emphasized rather than relieved by the presence of a devoted and mournful sidekick. Dillon has absorbed a craft and a responsibility, not become loyal to a restless, exciting system.

Actually this saves "Gunsmoke" from some of the sadism of the TV police story. Dillon's complete absorption in his craft and his responsibility forbids him the emotions of the sadist. There is violence, but no need for stripping and humiliating a criminal. On the surface it might appear to be no different in the detective story. In fact, special effort is made in the police story to show that professional cops can be perfectly loyal to the system and human beings at the same time—capable of a joke, sore feet, and a heavy appetite. Yet curiously, it is the very presence of this apparent and sentimentalized humanity which makes room for the emotions of the sadist in the climactic exposure and degradation of the criminal. And it is the disarming presence of such human foibles which helps to blur the immorality of the final cruelty.

*Since the stories are the products of several different writers, this description will not prove fully accurate every week, but it does characterize a frequent and recognizable theme.

The professional detachment of "Gunsmoke" may appear to border on the amoral, but it doesn't fall into sadism. This is an important achievement for any image of authority.

The business executive has also received considerable attention from TV writers as a subject for romantic drama. Here there would seem to be fulfilled *Time* magazine's dreams of romance about the Big Doer. Actually, however, these dramas about the business executives are less concerned to celebrate romantically the workings of an industrial society than the police story with its vast attention to the details of a functioning system. The police story is the best place to see the machinery of a rationalized society at work.

Ironically, though, neither does the romance

about the Big Doer center in the burdens of a policy maker, of a public man, as one might expect it to. In such romance there usually may be found a generalized excitement about power and occasional references to resounding values, but no real image of a man in whom the burden of public decision is assumed. Whenever TV writers get rheumy-eyed about the big men, they usually settle down to talk about personal ambition, irritation with cronies and domestic trouble. The real center of attention is the private tensions of the man in public life. He becomes an agonist rather than a doer.

Perhaps this accounts for some of the nostalgic power of the type of Matt Dillon (or Private Mulvaney, or the sheriff of "High Noon" for that matter). An image is furnished for the genuinely public man with a duty. Dillon reflects the pressure of a moral world, not in the style of a traditional Western by dressing up the Marshal in the symbols of the good man, or by aligning the peace of Dodge City with important values, but by focusing on a man who accepts the burden of public decision and knows something about the innards and consequences of an action. It is this kind of responsibility which has a certain appeal in the romance about the doer.

WILLIAM F. MAY

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE

KENNETH W. THOMPSON, our Contributing Editor in the field of foreign affairs who was in Europe during the eruption of the Hungarian and Suez crises, writes of "Europe's Crisis and America's Dilemma."

"Historians may record that . . . we lost the 'cold war' and paved the way to a third world war. Or they may say that this was the turning point in which we discovered our own errors as well as those of our friends . . ."

Did You Forget Someone This Christmas?

Then you'll wish to send a gift the recipient will find was *worth* waiting for!

It's not too late to give *Christianity and Crisis* at the *special* gift rate of \$2.50 per year. An appropriate card will inform persons you select of your gift, and your greeting will be renewed by *Christianity and Crisis* 24 times during the coming year.

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion

537 WEST 121 ST. • NEW YORK 27 • N. Y.

EDITORIAL BOARD

REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND JOHN C. BENNETT, *Chairmen*
WAYNE H. COWAN, *Managing Editor*
ARNOLD W. HEARN, *Assistant Editor*

M. SEARLE BATES WALDO BEACH AMOS WILDER
ROBERT McAFEE BROWN F. ERNEST JOHNSON
JOSEPH SITTLER HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

JAMES C. BAKER FRANCIS P. MILLER J. OSCAR LEE
UMPHREY LEE WILLIAM F. MAY ROGER L. SHINN
KENNETH W. THOMPSON EDWARD L. PARSONS
HENRY SMITH LEIPER JOHN A. MACKAY
LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

CONTENTS

CENTENNIAL THOUGHTS ABOUT WILSONIAN DIPLOMACY
HAROLD P. FORD

TV: THE ROMANCE OF THE DOER

WILLIAM F. MAY

Detroit Public Library
Book Receiving Dept.
5201 Woodward Ave.
Detroit 2, Mich.

27462 11-57